ReviewMedical care research and review : MCRR2024
Scope and Incentives for Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets With Regulated Competition: A Conceptual Framework and International Comparison.
Review in Medical care research and review : MCRR, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed.
- Ex ante evaluation of risk adjustment models for prospective provider payment: a conceptual framework and empirical application.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026Article
- Differentiation of morbidity measurement in Germany's morbidity-based risk adjustment depending on general practitioner and specialist treatment.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026Article
- Does Health-Based Prospective Risk Adjustment Adequately Compensate for Individuals Diagnosed With a New Chronic Disease?Medical care research and review : MCRR · 2026Article
- A framework for ex-ante evaluation of the potential effects of risk equalization and risk sharing in health insurance markets with regulated competition.Health economics review · 2024Review
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
10 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
In health insurance markets with regulated competition, regulators face the challenge of preventing risk selection. This paper provides a framework for analyzing the scope (i.e., potential actions by insurers and consumers) and incentives for risk selection in such markets. Our approach consists of three steps. First, we describe four types of risk selection: (a) selection by consumers in and out of the market, (b) selection by consumers between high- and low-value plans, (c) selection by insurers via plan design, and (d) selection by insurers via other channels such as marketing, customer service, and supplementary insurance. In a second step, we develop a conceptual framework of how regulation and features of health insurance markets affect the scope and incentives for risk selection along these four dimensions. In a third step, we use this framework to compare nine health insurance markets with regulated competition in Australia, Europe, Israel, and the United States.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the Socratic graph.