ArticlePNAS nexus2025
How opinion variation among in-groups can skew perceptions of ideological polarization.
Article in PNAS nexus, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
- Public perspectives on artificial intelligence in healthcare in the USA: a cross-sectional survey.BMJ digital health & AI · 2026Article
- The evolution of identity signals for co-ordination in diverse societies.Evolutionary human sciences · 2026Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
There is a widespread perception that society has been polarizing into groups with increasingly divergent opinions. Multiple studies have sought to quantify the degree of opinion divergence (or ideological polarization), typically relying on differences between self-reported opinions, and have reached mixed conclusions. We propose this inconsistency can be explained by the way individuals' subjective perceptions are shaped by their social identities. We introduce a formal framework to analyze opinion data that accounts for such asymmetric, dynamic perceptions. When members of an in-group become increasingly homogeneous on a given topic (i.e. when the variance of opinions in that group decreases), they perceive deviant opinions as increasingly distant from their own. Consequently, these individuals may perceive greater polarization than an objective, neutral observer would. Applying the framework to data on the opinions of Germans about climate change, we show that perceived polarization may depend as much on the dynamics of in-group variance as it does on actual opinion divergence in society. Moreover, we show that the direction of this effect may vary over time and across different partisan groups. Our framework offers an explanation why people might sometimes perceive higher levels of ideological polarization than surveys indicate, independent of social segregation, polarization-enforcing cognitive biases, or affect-driven attitudes towards out-groups.
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Identifiers
What Socratic holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the Socratic graph.