ArticleOpen mind : discoveries in cognitive science2025
Considering What We Know and What We Don't Know: Expectations and Confidence Guide Value Integration in Value-Based Decision-Making.
Article in Open mind : discoveries in cognitive science, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.
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Who cites it
8 citing papers in PubMed.
- Article
- Decision-making trades off learned and perceived information.PNAS nexus · 2026Article
- Learning to select computations in recurrent neural circuits.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2026Article
- Misspecified models create the appearance of adaptive control during value-based choice.Communications psychology · 2026Article
- Behavioral Signatures of Post-Decisional Attention in Preferential Choice.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2026Article
- Decision-making trades off learned and perceived information.Research square · 2025Article
- Common neural choice signals can emerge artefactually amid multiple distinct value signals.Nature human behaviour · 2024Article
- Advances in modeling learning and decision-making in neuroscience.Neuropsychopharmacology : official publication of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology · 2022Review
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
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Abstract
When making decisions, we often have more information about some options than others. Previous work has shown that people are more likely to choose options that they look at more and those that they are more confident in. But should one always prefer options one knows more about? Intuition suggests not. Rather, how additional information impacts our preferences should depend critically on how valuable we expect the options to be. Here, we formalize this intuition in a Bayesian sequential sampling model where attention and confidence influence the precision of momentary evidence. Our model makes a key prediction: attention and confidence both increase choice probability for better-than-average options, and both decrease choice probability for worse-than-average options. We confirm this prediction in two experiments in which we independently manipulate value and attention. Our results offer a novel perspective on prior work on the role of attention and confidence in decision-making, showing that people rely on contextual knowledge and uncertainty estimates to adaptively learn about their options and make better decisions.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the Socratic graph.