ArticlePsychological research2026
Rating our certainty: how confidence judgments amplify belief polarization.
Article in Psychological research, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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6 authors.
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Abstract
Although metacognitive reflection (e.g., thinking about our confidence or certainty in a decision) is often assumed to improve decision-making, recent research suggests that eliciting confidence ratings can sometimes produce counterintuitive results, including the amplification of subjective beliefs. We report three experiments investigating how trial-by-trial confidence judgments affect the extremity of beliefs. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants provided subjective ratings of how much they liked a series of paintings and the extent to which they agreed with various social axioms, either accompanied by confidence ratings or not. Across both studies, participants who were asked to rate their confidence, gave significantly more extreme responses relative to those who did not provide confidence ratings. By contrast, in Experiment 3, when participants provided objective estimates of the age of the paintings, confidence ratings led to less extreme estimates compared to a control group. We found no evidence that the effect of eliciting confidence ratings was moderated by the average confidence associated with a judgment. We situate these findings within the broader literature on metacognition and belief polarization, discussing possible mechanisms, such as demand characteristics, selective rationalization, and cognitive biases, that may explain why confidence judgments exacerbate rather than reduce extreme subjective beliefs. We conclude with implications for interventions seeking to address polarized thinking, highlighting that confidence measurement alone may backfire unless paired with strategies to encourage genuine self-reflection and open-mindedness.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the Socratic graph.