ArticlePloS one2026
Sources of individual variability in a pragmatic reference game: Effects of logical reasoning and Theory of Mind.
Article in PloS one, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
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1 citing paper in PubMed.
- The Role of Reinforcement Learning in Pragmatic Reasoning Tasks: Modeling and Validating the Sources of Individual Differences.Open mind : discoveries in cognitive science · 2026Article
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2 authors.
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Abstract
While in theory people are expected to adhere to rational communicative principles, a growing body of work shows that people vary widely in their tendency to draw pragmatic inferences. It has been suggested that these differences may, in part, stem from depth of reasoning: Previous work has shown that individual participants' response patterns in a pragmatic reference game are predicted by three probabilistic pragmatic models of different reasoning depth. However, those models are agnostic to the cognitive traits which underlie those differences. In this study, we systematically investigate sources of individual variation in a pragmatic reference game, where participants are required to draw ad-hoc implicatures of various complexity. We relate the observed variability in reference game performance to cognitive traits, specifically logical reasoning ability, working memory and Theory of Mind, as well as to the strategies reported by participants. We find a positive effect of logical reasoning and Theory of Mind on pragmatic inference. We do not find evidence for an effect of working memory.
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