Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42020522›Full record

ArticleCommunications psychology2026

Beliefs about accuracy shape confidence attributions to humans and artificial agents.

Clara Colombatto, Stephen M Fleming

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Communications psychology, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Clara ColombattoDepartment of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada. clara.colombatto@uwaterloo.ca.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3293-8741
Stephen M FlemingDepartment of Experimental Psychology and Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0233-4891

Funding

RCUK | Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) EP/V000748/1
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

To effectively communicate and collaborate with others, we must monitor not only other people's cognitive states (e.g., what someone thinks or believes) but also their metacognitive states (e.g., how confident they are in their beliefs). While humans routinely share confidence, either explicitly (e.g., "I am sure") or implicitly (e.g., via response times), metacognitive capabilities are still developing in artificial intelligence (AI), raising the question of how humans attribute confidence to AI systems. In seven pre-registered experiments (post-exclusion Ns = 113, 109, 56, 59, 52, 60, 57), participants observed human and AI agents make perceptual choices and reported how confident the observed agent seemed in each choice. Overall, attributions of confidence were sensitive to observed behaviour (e.g., task difficulty, accuracy, and response times), but also agent type: observers consistently overestimated the confidence of AI agents compared to humans-even when their behaviour was identical. This illusion of greater confidence in AI decisions was robust across behavioural profiles, agent descriptions, and decision-making domains (visual perception, general knowledge) but was reduced in more subjective decisions (emotion categorisation). An experimental manipulation further showed that illusions of confidence are rooted in prior beliefs about the agents' capabilities. Together, these investigations of metacognitive attributions reveal a powerful illusion of confidence in artificial systems and highlight a central role for attributions of metacognitive states in human-human and human-AI interactions.

Identifiers

PMID42020522
PMCPMC13461344

What Socratic holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the Socratic graph.